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Developing an organizational culture that facilitates radical innovation in 
a mature small to medium sized company: 
Emergent findings 
 
 
Abstract 
Existing theories in the broad field of innovation management suggest that organizational 
culture affects the propensity of firms to be innovative, in their new product development 
offerings.  A major thrust of inquiry implies that mature firms often lose their propensity to 
be innovative, as some aspects of organisational culture that were previously associated 
with successful incremental change, become the current cultural inhibitors of radical 
innovation.  Whilst a large proportion of the existing empirical research has concentrated 
on incremental innovation or innovation management in general, there is little known 
about the specific aspects of organisational culture that facilitate radical innovation.  
Furthermore, the literature tends to focus on ‘innovation stories’ in larger firms which 
often simply assume that smaller firms are more agile and therefore more innovative in 
their approach to value creation.  This paper reports the results of an exploratory case study 
into specific aspects of an organisational culture within a R&D setting that enable radical 
product innovation, in a small to medium sized UK based company in the tobacco industry.  
A grounded research methodology and an action research approach utilised an “issue” 
focus to surface the presence and intensity of cultural attributes that enable and inhibit 
radical product innovation.  This investigation identified nine emerging themes and key 
constructs of a “local” innovation culture that were found to influence radicalness in new 
product development ventures.  The interrelationships between the themes are mapped and 
discussed in the context of current theoretical perspectives in the field of innovation 
management.  Finally a conceptual framework incorporating two archetypal forms of 
innovation culture is outlined to articulate and scope the transition between these two 
“ideal” states. 
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The Need for Radical Innovation 
Innovation can be considered to exist along a continuum, from incremental innovation, in 
which effort is focused on trying to “do better, yet more of the same” to radical innovation 
in which ideas that are new to the company or new to the industry are actively being 
considered.  Essentially this is a degree of resonance with McFadzean’s (2000) notions of 
paradigm preserving to paradigm breaking activities happing in this context.  For 
incremental innovation much is known about the management of the process, the 
innovation process is routine and systematic and can be modelled relatively simply.  For 
radical innovation less is known about its management, the process is ill-defined and 
modelling it is more complex.  See Diagram 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1.  The Innovation Continuum 
 
     Clearly innovation matters and it is important for success in design and manufacturing 
firms (DTI, 2003).  Utterback (1994) states that innovation is a central determinant of 
longer-run success and failure for manufacturing firms.  Successful companies are 
generally effective at responding to evolutionary changes in their markets.  Where they run 
into trouble is in handling or initiating revolutionary changes in their markets or in dealing 
with disruptive technologies (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000).  If a company is looking 
for growth levels that are significantly larger than the growth of the industry then it must 
take discontinuous or radical innovation seriously (Bessant, Birkinshaw and Delbridge, 
2004).  This perspective is supported by McDermott and Handfield (2000) who argue that 
in order to achieve long term growth firms need either novel replacements, new to the 
market products, or breakthrough products.  Firms that focus only on incremental 
innovation are avoiding risk, but at the same time are missing opportunities.  Utterback 
(1994) and Christensen (1997) noted how firms that dominate one generation of 
technology often fail to maintain leadership in the next.  Radical innovation has one main 
benefit over incremental innovation which is that it creates products that do not replace or 
supplant other products, but adds something new; -‘it takes you out of the “zero-sum” 
game that characterises many industry battlegrounds’ (Bessant, Birkinshaw et al, 2004:  
29). 
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     Radical innovation is associated with breakthrough ideas (Gundling, 2000; O'Connor 
and Rice, 2001) and with the development of new business or product lines based on new 
ideas or technologies or substantial cost reductions that transform the economics of a 
business (Leifer, McDermott, O’Connor, Peters, Rice, and Veyzer, 2000).  Hill and 
Rothaermel (2003:  258) differentiate between the two types of innovation in that an 
incremental technological innovation builds squarely upon the established knowledge base 
used by incumbent firms, and it steadily improves the methods or materials used to achieve 
the firm’s objective of profitably satisfying customer needs.  In contrast, a radical 
technological innovation involves methods and materials that are novel to the incumbents. 
 
Managing Radical Innovation 
Whilst incremental innovations in new product introduction appear to be dependent on 
traditional management structures and processes (Ettlie, Bridges and O'Keefe, 1984), 
radical innovation can demand an organizational response that reaches beyond the “steady-
state” approach to managing innovation (McDermott and O’Connor, 2002).  Radical 
innovation is high-risk and high-return, and therefore does not respond well to the 
management practices applied to incremental innovation activities. 
     For radical product innovation the emphasis is on dramatic departures from existing 
products or their logical extensions (Veryzer, 1998).  Increasingly radical innovations may 
utilise potentially disruptive technologies and so require a different set of rules to manage 
the innovation process.  In such cases radical innovations involve the development of a 
new technological paradigm that create new knowledge and understanding, and potentially 
new industrial sectors.  Uncertainty plagues radical innovation projects, whether this is 
technical, market, organizational or resource uncertainties.  Consequently organisations are 
moving into unknown territory and experiment with new processes that largely elude 
systemization (O'Connor and McDermott, 2004).  A radical innovation project is also 
marked by discontinuities, gaps, critical transitions and leverage points, often rendering 
traditional management modes of operation inappropriate (Leifer et al, 2000).  This 
indicates why the business practices in some larger established firms mitigate against 
radical innovation, as the systems and processes that ensure continuity (the incremental 
improvements) become the inhibitors to innovation. (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Ahuja 
and Lampert, 2001). 
 
Context of the case study 
A case study of a small to medium sized firm based in the UK was used as a basis for 
examining the innovation culture that facilitates radical innovation.  A case study provides 
the opportunity to investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when  the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident 
(Yin, 2003).  The firm in the case study is Cerulean, an international company that designs, 
manufactures, markets and supports a range of quality measurement equipment for the 
tobacco industry and specialized tube packing machines world-wide.  Over the last ten 
years the company has grown to be a dominant player in its international market sectors 
but now finds itself unable to provide the “stream of innovative new products” that it 
believes is necessary to survive and grow.  The company had a history of incremental 
innovation but had been unsuccessful in generating radical innovations from within.  The 
perception from within the company was that the organizational culture –“the way we do 
things round here” was inhibiting radical innovation.  Emphasis was placed on successful 
outcomes, risk was avoided and speculative or exploratory developments were avoided, in 
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order to focus on product enhancements.  Recent product introductions have been “me too” 
products that responded to a competitor offering or an evolution of an existing product.  
The last example of a product that included a radical innovation was conceived about five 
years ago.  This radical innovation came from the use of an external consultancy to create 
the concept that was later developed and productionized within Cerulean.  In order for the 
company to prosper, it was believed that it had to develop the capability to develop new 
lines of products as well as improving existing ones.  Regaining the entrepreneurial spirit 
of the company from ten years previously was desired, but in a manner that could co-exist 
along with the existing business.  Recent years had seen many improvements in using 
modern methods and procedures and these were also essential for efficient operation of the 
business. 
     Cerulean is an operating division of Molins plc.  It has a head office in Milton Keynes 
in the UK.  Design, development and manufacturing are all carried out exclusively at the 
Milton Keynes head office.  This facility also contains the administration functions, Sales 
and Customer Service for the Europe, Middle East and Africa regions.  There are service, 
or sales and service centres in the USA, Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa, Germany, India, 
Malaysia, and China.  There are 105 people employed by the company with around 70 of 
these being based at the Milton Keynes head office.  The Development team within 
Cerulean was the subject of the research.  This is a team of around 15 development 
engineers with length of service ranging from less than one year to over thirty years.  The 
team comprises skills in mechanical, electrical, electronic and software engineering. 
 
Organizing for radical innovation: the role of culture 
Although there are many dimensions that influence both incremental and radical 
innovation, for example, national systems, knowledge flows and labour markets, it is 
generally agreed that organizational culture is a significant influence on the propensity of 
an organization towards innovation (Tidd, Bessant, and Pavitt, 2001).  Whilst there is 
disagreement about how to best organize for radical innovation, most managers agree that 
radical innovation is invariably a confused, uncertain process (Humble and Jones, 1989) 
when compared to incremental improvement- a continuing process with a more systematic 
approach to change.   The original driving force for innovation is technological or the 
personal curiosity of individuals, rather than market led (Humble and Jones, 1989) and for 
most operating businesses, it is “an unnatural act” because the uncertainty is too high, the 
time horizon too long, and the investment too large, given the risks.  Organizing for 
discontinuous innovation, especially in the highly uncertain “fuzzy front end” of the 
process, is often separated from ongoing business activities (Rice, O’Connor, Peters and 
Morone, 1998). 
     Different kinds of innovation require different kinds of organizational hardware- 
structures, systems and rewards and different kinds of software- human resources, 
networks and culture.  During periods of incremental change organizations can rely on 
units with relatively formalized roles and responsibilities, centralized procedures, 
functional structures, efficiency-oriented cultures, strong manufacturing and sales 
capabilities and relatively homogeneous, older and experienced human resources.  These 
units are characterized by a high degree of inertia, emphasizing efficiency, teamwork and 
continuous improvement.  During periods of discontinuous innovation, organizations 
require entrepreneurial “skunkworks” type of units.  These units are relatively small, have 
loose decentralized product structures, experimental cultures, strong entrepreneurial and 
technical competencies and relatively young and heterogeneous employees.  They build 
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new experience bases and knowledge systems (Tushman and O'Reilly III, 1999).  
Incremental innovation usually emphasizes cost or feature improvements in existing 
products or services largely depend on exploitation competencies.  In contrast radical 
innovation concerns the development of new business or product lines, based on new ideas 
or technologies or substantial cost reductions that transform the economics of a business 
and require exploration competencies (Leifer et al, 2000).  Diagram 2 summarizes the 
basic differences between incremental and radical innovation. 
 
Incremental                                                                                                                       Radical 
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Diagram 2.  Characteristics of Innovation 
 
     It is suggested that some of the mechanisms that support incremental innovation can be 
counter-productive to radical innovation.  ‘What is sound management practice for 
incremental innovation- where speed, cycle time, and quick cash recovery are primary 
objectives- might actually hamper the radical innovation's progress’ (Rice, O’Connor et al, 
1998:  52).  Von Stamm (2003:  260) argues that ‘radical ideas tend to need room to grow 
and develop, they tend to change shape and scope’ and therefore suggestion schemes, 
which are the foundation for incremental innovation, are not good for radical innovation.  
Organization cultures that facilitate radical innovation tend to be tolerant of risk taking and 
the uncertainty that facilitates this type of innovation (Claver, Llopis and Molina, 1998). 
     Veryzer (1998) refers to discontinuous or radical innovation as inherently messy, 
fraught with uncertainty and unfamiliarity.  The process is non-linear, stochastic, highly 
explorative and experimental, involving probing and learning rather than targeting and 
developing (Rice, O’Connor et al, 1998).  Management of radical innovation is suggested 
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to be preaching and persuading rather than managing a defined process (Tushman and 
O’Reilly III, 1996).  The organizational culture and adherence to process found in large 
firms tends to push efforts towards low risk incremental innovation (Dougherty and Heller, 
1994).  Less is known about effective management of the development process for radical 
innovation than for incremental.  ‘It is unclear what the landscape for radical NPD looks 
like’ (McDermott, 1999:  632), and rather than being a predictable process ‘developing 
radical innovations involves considerable risk and requires insight and foresight’ 
(O'Connor and Veryzer, 2001:  231). 
     Von Stamm (2003:  271) argues that ‘incremental and radical innovation require very 
different business conditions, skills, structures and processes’.  This is supported by 
McDermott and Handfield (1996:  371) who suggest that ‘it is not unreasonable to expect 
that successful practices associated with new product development may be significantly 
different for discontinuous and incremental projects.’  The organizational culture that 
supports incremental may not therefore act in the same way to facilitate radical innovation.  
In summary, the literature suggests that organizational culture enablers and inhibitors have 
an effect on the propensity of an organization to be innovative in new product development 
(Kanter, 1988; Ahmed, 1998; Martins and Terblanche, 2003).  It indicates that mature 
firms often lose this propensity to be innovative, as the mechanisms that allow them to be 
successful become inhibitors to innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Dougherty and Heller, 
1994; Leifer et al, 2000; Leifer, O'Connor and Rice, 2001). 
 
A conceptual framework to understand innovation culture 
In order to develop a framework for understanding innovation culture, Schein’s model of 
organizational culture is proposed (1984; 1991; 1992).  Schein suggests that organizational 
culture is what a group learns over a period of time as the group solves its problems of 
survival.  He argues that culture is a pattern of basic assumptions that have been evolved, 
discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration.  The model exists at three levels, artefacts, values and 
basic assumptions.  This is shown in Diagram 3. 
Artefacts are the visible organizational structures and processes.  They include written and 
spoken language, the physical space and layout of the organization and the overt behaviour 
of the individuals.  Schein divides these into three levels.  The first is concerned with the 
physical artefacts like company logos.  The second level is concerned with behaviour 
including organizational rituals.  The third level is concerned with organizational 
anecdotes, stories and myths, and organizational heroes and villains.  Values are the social 
principles, goals and standards held within the culture to have intrinsic worth.  They define 
what the members of the organization care about.  They are unwritten rules that allow 
members of a culture to know what is expected of them.  The organizational culture 
reflects the values of its employees.  By using these values the members are able to make 
decisions in order to tackle problems, issues and to develop solutions.  Underlying 
Assumptions are at the most invisible level of the model.  These assumptions are taken for 
granted beliefs and habits of perception, thought and feeling.  They are rarely made 
explicit.  When a solution to a problem works repeatedly it becomes taken for granted.  
These assumptions become learned responses that guide behaviour and determine how 
members think, act and feel.  Schein’s model of culture is a dynamic one.  It suggests that 
the three different levels are continuously interacting to provide an emergent perspective of 
organizational culture. 
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Diagram 3.  Schein’s model of Organizational culture 
 
     Schein’s view focuses on what artefacts and values reveal about basic assumptions.  
The dynamic model asks, “how is culture constituted by assumptions, values, artefacts, 
symbols and the processes that link them?”.  All of the processes co-occur in a continuous 
production and reproduction of culture in both its stable and changing forms and 
conditions (Hatch, 1993).  This dynamic model resonates with the perspective of 
innovation culture as a continuum from incremental (do better) to radical (do differently), 
and thus forms a basis for developing a framework to facilitate radical innovation. 
     The concept of archetypes (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993) is introduced to facilitate a 
descriptive representation of the characteristics of the two innovation “types”- radical and 
incremental.  An archetype is defined in terms of two general statements.  First, 
organizational structures and management systems are best understood by analysis of 
overall patterns rather than by analysis of narrowly drawn sets of organizational properties.  
This is the holistic perspective.  Second, patterns are a function of the ideas, beliefs and 
values the components of an “interpretative scheme”- that underpin and are embodied in 
organizational structures and systems.  An archetype is thus a set of structures and systems 
that reflects a single interpretative scheme.  This way of defining an archetype is a 
departure from the more common treatment of structures and systems as disembodied 
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attributes of organizations, which are linked in an adaptive way to context and 
performance.  Greenwood and Hinings suggest that structures and systems are not neutral 
instruments but embody, wittingly or otherwise, intentions, aspirations and purposes. 
     Schein’s dynamic perspective of organizational culture fits well with the dynamic view 
of organization design posited by Greenwood and Hinings and the researcher’s critical 
realist (Bhaskar, 1978) perspective of organisational culture as emergent.  Schein suggests 
that culture is what a group learns over a period of time as the group solves its problems of 
survival.  He argues that culture is a pattern of basic assumptions that have been evolved, 
discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration.  The model posited by Schein suggests organizational 
culture exists at three levels, artefacts, values and basic assumptions.  Greenwood and 
Hinings argue that archetypes reflect the holistic approach to the study of organizational 
arrangements and recognize interpretive schemes as providing the basis of pattern.  
Schein’s holistic perspective of organizational culture resonates with this interpretative 
scheme. 
     Therefore the two archetypes proposed reflect the “ideal” positions for organization 
culture at either end of the innovation continuum.  Type I is an incremental approach to 
innovation.  A tendency to maintain or improve in small incremental steps – a “do better” 
attitude.  This archetype is typical of a mature company.  Type II is a radical approach to 
innovation.  There is a desire to explore, to push the boundaries – a “do different” attitude.  
This archetype is typical of an entrepreneurial or “start-up” company. 
 
Transition across archetypes 
Greenwood and Hinings suggest that organizations tend to operate with structures and 
systems that approximate archetypes and that these organizations tend to move towards 
archetype coherence.  Passage between archetypes (organizational change) is less common 
than archetype stability (organizational inertia).  They also argue that ‘archetypes are 
probably institutionally specific’ (1993:  1057).  This indicates that transition from Type I 
to Type II innovation culture is likely to facilitated by organization specific interventions, 
rather than a gradual diffusion.  These interventions can be perceived as actions taken at 
the artefact and value level in Schein’s model of culture.  These two levels are inter-related 
and Schein argues that change in culture must be undertaken by attempting to change 
values and underlying assumptions.  A value leads to a behaviour, and as that behaviour 
begins to solve the problem which prompted it, the value gradually is transformed into an 
underlying assumption about how things really are.  As the assumption is increasingly 
taken for granted, it drops out of awareness, thus creating a shift in the organizational 
culture.  Archetypes provide a holistic perspective of the innovation culture.  Change 
therefore, from Type I to Type II should be conceived as a holistic process. 
 
Research methodology 
A grounded approach was adopted to surfacing the innovation culture characteristics that 
facilitate radical innovation.  The research question was formulated as, “What aspects of 
organizational culture facilitate radical product innovation?”  A grounded approach 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Partington, 2002) to the research and participation by the 
Development team being studied allowed the data to be developed and refined.  As the 
researcher is a manager in the company, this involved a participative approach (Reason and 
Bradbury, 2001; Coughlan and Coghlan, 2002).  The plan for the research is shown in 
Diagram 4. 
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Diagram 4.  Research plan 
 
     The method of identifying organizational culture characteristics was to use an issue to 
focus the members’ attention on a specific action or event.  The more visible 
manifestations of culture are artefacts.  These may be easy to observe but difficult to 
decipher.  Values and basic assumptions tend to remain hidden and may only reflect 
rationalizations or aspirations (Schein, 1992).  An issue focus (Sackmann, 1991) enables 
the surfacing of the hidden components of culture.  Given the ubiquitous nature of culture, 
organizational members cannot immediately reflect on their culture and describe it.  A key 
concern in eliciting tacit aspects of culture is to provide a stimulus to respondents so that 
they are forced to make an interpretation that is based on their cultural framework rather 
than on the researcher.  The stimulus should provide a specific context but leave enough 
latitude for interpretation.  Faced with ambiguity people tend to draw on pre-existing 
categories already available to them for sense making.  The tacit components of culture 
become apparent in the specific interpretations attributed by the respondents.  In addition, 
an issue focus enables comparisons, because it introduces a specific context that forces 
respondents to draw on their existing knowledge.  It channels the attention of the 
respondents to the same cultural aspects within a given organization and reveals the 
perceptual framework they are using to conceptualize the issue.  To understand the 
Development team’s culture it was necessary to identify shared values and basic 
assumptions as well as the artefacts.  This was achieved by asking the team members to 
discuss the concrete examples of successful and less successful radical innovation. 
     The issue used was an example of a good and a less successful radical innovation.  The 
definition of radical was that the innovation involved application of a significant new 
technology to new market opportunities.  The examples chosen by the participants were of 
a product launched in 1999 that was perceived as only moderately unsuccessful, and the 
use of a vision system that was perceived as being more successful.  Both these 
innovations fitted the criteria to be considered “radical”. 
     Two software packages were used to facilitate data gathering and analysis.  Decision 
Explorer is a package that allows the drawing of cognitive maps.  It was developed to help 
members of a team map their view of a problem and more effectively negotiate a 
consensus for action.  It displays constructs and linkages between constructs that represent 
the meaning of the construct in terms of the explanations and consequences.  These links 
are not taken to be causal in a precise way.  The link is in the form of an arrow to show the 
nature of the linkage.  An arrow out of a construct shows a consequence and an arrow into 
a construct an explanation.  Each arrow gives explanatory meaning to one construct and 
consequential meaning to another (Eden, 1988).  NVivo is a package that facilitates 
analysis of qualitative data.  This software permits the coding and subsequent analysis of 
attributes within a series of documents. 
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Data gathering and analysis 
The objective of the data gathering interviews was to take a good and a . 
less successful example of radical innovation project experienced by the development team 
and allow the team members to talk about their experiences of radical innovation.  These 
innovation projects contained features that could be considered as radical innovation (new 
to the company, new to the industry) (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) and as a clear departure 
from what had gone before (Delbecq and Mills, 1985; Dewar and Dutton, 1986).  The 
interviews were semi-structured and cognitive mapping (Eden, 1988; Jenkins, 2002) 
techniques were used to capture the views of each participant.  Each interview was 
recorded and transcribed.  Cognitive maps (Eden, 1988; Langfield-Smith, 1992; Swan, 
1997) on the organizational culture aspects influencing the radical product innovation were 
drawn.  These were later converted to Decision Explorer and refined during follow up 
interviews with each interviewee.  Each follow up interview was also recorded and 
transcribed. 
     The individual cognitive maps were individually validated and conflated into a single 
map to represent the development team’s collective cognition.  The single map was further 
validated and refined.  In a parallel process each of the transcripts was analysed using 
NVivo and codes were produced from transcript content analysis that represented the 
aspects of organizational culture that influenced radical product innovation.  The analysis 
produced fifty-eight data categories that influenced radical product innovation.  A 
collective decision was taken to further validate and refine the coding structure through a 
series of four workshops.  This resulted in the clustering of codes into aggregate themes 
(higher level codes) that represented aspects of the innovation culture that were 
collectively considered to be positively associated with the facilitation of radical 
innovation.  The themes and key constructs emerged through an inductive process in which 
the development team members continuously refined their meaning, and hence internal 
validity, in a collective manner (via workshops).  The description and title for the themes is 
also an output from the workshop sessions. 
 
Findings:  Emerging themes & key constructs 
Nine themes and key constructs were identified and are briefly described below:  
Company Infrastructure – Resources 
This relates to the structure of the company around the development team, the resources 
made available to the team and the management style in which the team operate.  It is 
termed “company” as the team members felt it related to the broader company that the 
team operates within.  The theme is concerned with characteristics that are external to the 
team and which the team perceive as having no influence over. 
External Confidence –Trust and Self Belief 
This relates to the team’s perceptions about themselves by company members who are 
outside the development team, in particular the top management.  These characteristics 
cross the team boundary, originating from outside the team and acting upon the team.  The 
data categories are more intangible than those grouped in the Company Infrastructure – 
Resources theme. 
Focus (Clarity) on Clear Objectives 
This theme relates to the concept of having a clear and well defined objective for the 
development project and having an unmoving target during the time the development 
project is active.  The team felt that the data categories in this theme were external in that 
the specification would be provided from outside the team, with most team members 
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considering it top management’s job to come up with the idea for a product and to provide 
a clear specification. 
Team Constitution 
This relates to the internal makeup of the team.  It refers to the nature and composition of 
the team members and the data categories were seen as tangible and easily identified 
amongst the team members.  They refer to the team as a whole and to the individual team 
members.  The team characteristics related to this theme were considered to be internal to 
the team but the composition and manifest of team skills and experiences were perceived 
as being outside the control of the team, with top management the controller of these 
aspects. 
External Perspectives, Inputs / Influences 
This theme links data categories concerned with the team’s interfacing with environments 
outside of the company.  It relates to links to outside agencies and organizations that 
influence the radical innovation capability of the Development team.  The data categories 
in this theme are perceived as being associated with external sources of information that 
are related to product needs or to available technologies. 
Freedom / Latitude 
This theme relates to the opportunity to take autonomous action.  It groups together data 
categories associated with freedom to make decisions, to experiment, to define their own 
direction as opposed to having a pre-defined direction provided for them, and the 
opportunity to be self-managing and self-directing. 
Attitude to Risk 
This refers to the attitude within the team to taking risks.  The data categories that relate to 
it include being adventurous, open to new and untried avenues and solutions to problems, 
and to being willing to make and learn from mistakes.  It is influenced by the other themes 
but determines the behaviour of the team members when confronted with choices relating 
to unknown versus known and therefore safe options. 
Internal Confidence, Trust – Self Belief 
This theme groups together data categories associated with the team’s belief in itself and 
confidence to resolve problems.  It includes categories such as how the team members 
interact, how they support each other, how they perceive each other.  It refers also to the 
confidence the team have in their own capability to produce solutions that are radical. 
Department Growth and Development 
This refers to the development team gaining knowledge and experience, and exploration of 
potential solutions.  The theme groups the data categories that relate to the pushing of 
boundaries and desire to learn and explore.  With this theme, there is an inherent 
requirement to cross the team boundary. 
 
The frequency of occurrence of each theme in the interviews is shown in Table I. 
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Table I.  Frequency of occurrence of themes in interviews 
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6 ■ ■ ■  ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
7 ■ ■ ■ ■  ■  ■ ■ 
8 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■  ■ ■ 
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10 ■ ■ ■    ■ ■  
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Validity 
Taking the requirements suggested by Coghlan and Brannick (2001), rigour during 
participative action research is established by:- 
Use of action research learning cycles. 
Repeated refining took place following data gathering and the involvement and 
participation of the Development team ensured that the findings in each of the group 
sessions have been developed and built upon at each subsequent session.  Each stage of the 
research process was discussed with the Development team and their input sought.  The 
results were fed back to them and their response solicited and used to develop the next 
stage of the process. 
How multiple data sources were assessed to provide contradictory and confirming 
interpretations. 
The data gathered during the interviews provided one source.  Observations and reflections 
made in the researcher’s journal provide a second perspective.  Comments made by the 
acting Technical Director provide a third perspective.  This individual was previously the 
Sales and Marketing Director and from mid February 2004 until November 2004 was 
responsible for the Development team.  An interview with the acting Technical Director 
produced data that supported the findings from the pilot and main interviews and 
researcher observation. 
Evidence of how the researcher challenged and tested assumptions and interpretations 
continuously throughout the project. 
This has happened in two ways.  The participation of the Development team to refine the 
gathered data provides one aspect of the testing process.  Reflection and discussion with 
13 
Cerulean employees outside the Development team provides an additional perspective.  
The results of the project have also been presented at various stages during the project to 
academic evaluation at a doctoral colloquium and at an Innovation Leadership Centre 
meeting. 
How the interpretations and outcomes are challenged, supported or dis-confirmed by 
existing literature. 
An evaluation of how the outcomes are compared and contrasted with the literature is 
presented as part of this paper. 
 
Evaluating the findings in theory 
The nine themes developed with the team represent the areas of innovation culture that 
were influencing radical innovation within Cerulean.  These themes can be related to the 
literature on innovation culture, and relationships between the themes can be drawn based 
on this literature. 
Freedom / Latitude 
Risk is related to freedom to explore (Amabile, 1988b; Ekvall, 1991).  Freedom to develop 
is widely recognized as a prerequisite for innovation (Rickards, 1985; Amabile, 1988b; 
Prather, 2000; Nijhof, Krabbendam and Looise, 2002).  Freedom in this context refers to 
deciding what to do or how to do accomplish the task, a sense of control over one’s own 
work and ideas.  The most important type of freedom is operational autonomy- freedom in 
the day-to-day conduct of one’s work, freedom in deciding how to achieve the overall goal 
or mission.  Organizational characteristics such as openness are supportive of innovation 
success (Huizenga, 2000).  Prather (2000) also argues that trust and openness are important 
in shaping the climate for innovation.  This is in resonance with Kaplan (1960) who 
suggests that freedom to chose problems and change direction (within restricted limits of 
programs and projects and goals of the organization) is one of the essential factors that 
positively influence creativity. 
     In an incremental environment the degree of freedom can be reduced and replaced with 
systems and procedures.  These systems and procedures encourage careful improvement on 
that which already exists and are appropriate for successful operation of a business – the 
“do better” activities.  The routines and systems that work well for normal business 
operation become inhibitors when applied to radical innovation development where 
experimentation and exploration are encouraged (Christensen, 1997; Sutton, 2001; Farson 
and Keyes, 2002).  Abetti (2003) argues that over management can be as much an inhibitor 
to radical innovation as under management.  Management of radical innovations requires 
balancing the natural desire of control with the realization of insufficient technical and 
market knowledge in order to guide and assist, rather than interfere with and control the 
innovators. 
Attitude to Risk 
‘Attempts at radical innovation produce more failures than successes, and the magnitude 
and timing of results are highly unpredictable.  Faced with these double-barrelled 
negatives, it is not surprising that executives feel more comfortable in other approaches to 
future growth; sticking to their knitting; gaining access to innovative technologies through 
acquisitions; or being a “fast follower” as new concepts enter the competitive arena’ 
(Leifer et al, 2000:  4).  Attitude to risk influences the way team members deal with 
uncertain situations (Schmitt, 2003).  Groups that are risk averse will inhibit radical 
innovation (Ekvall, 1996; Harborne and Johne, 2003; Simon, McKeough, Ayers, Rinehart 
and Alexia, 2003).  The predilection towards conforming acts and rewards for conforming- 
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risk aversion- is suggested by Bouwen (1991) to inherently kill innovative ideas.  ‘Radical 
innovation will not happen without the right people.  People with risk taking propensity, 
drive, and out-of-the-box thinking were involved in every project we followed’ (Leifer, 
O'Connor et al, 2001:  110).  An informal, open, and inquiring environment that values 
experimentation, with leaders promoting innovation by creating a shared belief that team 
members are safe to take interpersonal risks will facilitate radical innovation (Claver, 
Llopis et al, 1998; Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2002; Gudmundson, Tower and Harman, 2003; 
Harborne and Johne, 2003). 
Growth / Development 
Marquis suggests that one of the lessons from companies that are successful innovators is 
that the main source of innovation is from people within the company.  He states that 
‘training and experience of the people right in your own firm are the principal sources of 
information for successful innovations’ (1988:  85).  Learning from mistakes is a part of 
the growth of the group and development of both individual and group skills and 
experiences (Frohman, 1998; Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2002; Chatman and Cha, 2003).  
Group members should be encouraged and stretched beyond their comfort zone.  A 
managed learning process assigns challenging projects, and assists and monitors the 
individual participants (Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2002).  Engaging in shared learning and 
development across organizational boundaries, and increasingly across regional and 
national ones, facilitates the growth and development of the group and individuals and 
facilitates “do different” as well as “do better” innovation (Bessant, 2003).  Development 
can take the form of a knowledge brokering cycle, where the best innovators systematically 
use old ideas as the raw materials for one new idea after another (Hargadon and Sutton, 
2000). 
External confidence 
Senior management must be passionate about supporting radical innovation.  The support, 
involvement, commitment and the championing of the CEO and senior management is a 
critical success factor.  The role of radical innovation in accomplishing the company’s 
long-term strategies and objectives must be clearly stated and reinforced at all levels 
(Simon, McKeough et al, 2003).  However although top management’s support is strongly 
related to technical performance there is no indication that this becomes more important 
when the innovation is radical (Lee and Na, 1994).  Pride in the team, in the company, 
coupled with knowing that innovation is mainstream rather than counter-cultural helps to 
stimulate innovation.  Organizations with “cultures of pride” in the company’s 
achievements and in the achievements and abilities of individuals will find themselves 
more innovative (Kanter, 1988).  Belief in the team can be a major enabler for radical 
innovation.  An example is the development of the Polaroid Land camera.  With weeks to 
go before the deadline, it was Dr Land’s unwavering support that drove his team beyond 
their limits to achieve a breakthrough innovation (Mascitelli, 2000). 
Internal confidence 
Creative thinking depends to some extent on the personality characteristics related to 
independence, self-discipline, tolerance for ambiguity, perseverance in the face of 
frustration, and a relative lack of concern for social approval.  It is the “something extra” of 
creative performance (Amabile, 1997).  This is supported by Hauser who argues that a 
culture that enables conflicts concerning discussion and prevents emotional conflicts will 
facilitate the early stages of innovation (1998).  Employees who acknowledge and support 
each others’ work and do not waste time protecting their own ideas or feeling threatened 
by others will facilitate this type of environment (Heilmeir, 2000; Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 
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2002).  Nemeth (1997:  72) argues that ‘dissent is a very economical mechanism for 
producing innovation.’  In this environment people trust that others will listen to, learn 
from and inform them in order to facilitate innovation (Frohman, 1998).  For radical 
innovation, breakthroughs occur when thinking outside the box - making strategic trade-
offs between conflicting priorities, attempting to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable 
(Syrett and Lammiman, 2002).  Having a team who are confident in themselves will 
facilitate taking such a perspective as there will be no tendency to adopt a “not invented 
here” approach (Roberts, 1988; Schroeder, Scudder and Elm, 1989). 
External perspective 
‘The need for external perspectives seems almost self evident’ (Wolpert, 2002:  78).  
Successful innovation requires the ability to harvest ideas and competencies from a wide 
array of sources.  If a company stays locked within its own four walls it will be unable to 
uncover and exploit opportunities outside its existing businesses or beyond its current 
technical or operational capabilities.  This insularity may satisfy incremental innovation 
but is unlikely to be of benefit for radical innovation (Wolpert, 2002).    The exposure to 
experience and technology outside the team or the company is a necessary component for 
innovation (Sutton and Kelley, 1997).  Huizenga (2000) found that external sources are 
used more than internal sources to create knowledge and that co-operation with universities 
is positively correlated with innovation success.  Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1990) found 
that in a study into new product innovation in 100 companies, one of the major factors that 
separated winners from losers was the effective use of outside technology and external 
scientific communication.  Willingness to communicate with external stakeholders 
(Hauser, 1998) and linkages with external sources (Rothwell and Dodgson, 1991; 
Rothwell, 1992) will facilitate innovation.  Discontinuous innovations tend to originate in 
the environment and are initiated by individuals operating as boundary spanners and gate-
keepers for the firm.  It is this process of identifying, understanding and acting on external 
emerging patterns in the environment that is the essence of radical innovation (Reid and de 
Bretani, 2004).  Developing radical or disruptive innovations requires the meshing of 
sophisticated technological and market knowledge with visions about the future (von 
Wartburg, Teichert and Rost, 2003). 
Clear objectives 
Radical innovation is invariably a confused, uncertain process (Humble and Jones, 1989).  
Too specific a requirement will constrain the development to “do better” innovations.  A 
lack of clarity in the project specification is likely to facilitate radical innovation, in that it 
permits latitude about how to solve the problem.  The team members are not constrained to 
clearly defined and known methods.  For radical innovation, “order and clarity” (generally 
accepted to support incremental innovation) may be detrimental.  ‘It is a well-known 
phenomenon that ambiguity is not threatening to highly creative people.  On the contrary 
they become stimulated by it, they see the possibilities in an unclear situation.  The effect 
of clear objectives on radical innovation ability is considered to be different from 
incremental innovation ability.  General direction and strategic clarity are required for both 
types of innovation.  Having clear objectives at tactical level is considered to be an enabler 
for incremental innovation only (Reid and de Bretani, 2004).  Idea generation is the 
starting point for both radical and incremental innovation.  Incremental ideas generally 
come from ongoing interaction between a company and its customer.  For radical 
innovation ideas are much more likely to result from the synthesis of new and non-obvious 
insights from a disparate repertoire of technical information-the “fuzzy front end” (Leifer 
et al, 2000). 
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Team Constitution 
Composition of an effective radical innovation team is suggested as comprising people 
with superior technical capability who are inquisitive, passionate, not afraid to be different, 
broadly educated, extremely bright, integrative, aggressive, flexible, able to take risks, 
goal-orientated, entrepreneurial and eager to learn the business. (Leifer et al, 2000).  
Innovators tend to be non-conformers and will disregard or violate existing organizational 
rules and norms as the need arises (Glynn, 1996).  Selection of appropriate people, 
committed to the long term will facilitate breakthrough innovations (Wolff, 1988). 
     People appropriate for radical innovation are curious entrepreneurial people, solution 
finders not problem solvers (Leifer, O'Connor et al, 2001; Simon, McKeough et al, 2003).  
Team composition should be characterized by breadth of experience in addition to depth, a 
combination of product development skills and functional sophistication (Heine, 2001; 
McDermott and O’Connor, 2002).  Non-conforming individuals and lateral thinkers add 
the ability to think of “do different” solutions to problems.  Sternberg, O’Hara and Lubard 
(1997) argue that the type of personality required is one of determination and persistence in 
overcoming obstacles.  They argue that creativity requires a risk-taking personality, 
someone who can take a stand and be a contrarian. 
     Team composition should be characterized by breadth of experience in addition to 
depth.   A combination of product development skills and functional sophistication along 
with the lateral thinkers will facilitate radical innovation (McDermott and O’Connor, 
2002).  Group diversity is a major influence upon technical performance.  A group that 
stabilizes its membership for too long not only decreases its productivity but tends to 
become insular (Roberts, 1988).  In a similar manner, Tushman and O’Reilly III argue that 
team heterogeneity facilitates discontinuous innovation (1999). 
Company infrastructure 
Centralization and formalization should be reduced in order to facilitate radical innovation 
(Ekvall, 1996).  The concept of an organic organization that can react to change as opposed 
to a mechanistic one that is bureaucratic and fixed has a long been established (Burns and 
Stalker, 1966; Gresov, 1984).  Organizations that are structurally complex, formal and 
decentralized are likely to introduce new products and adopt only incremental departures 
from process technology when they are innovative.  Incremental innovation processes that 
lead to new product introduction appear to be dependent on more traditional structural 
arrangements and market oriented strategies.  An aggressive technology policy and unique 
structural arrangements appear to be necessary precursors to pre-innovation conditions that 
support radical innovation (Ettlie, Bridges et al, 1984).  High innovation companies in 
USA, Europe and Japan have flatter organization structures, smaller operating divisions 
and smaller project teams (Kanter, 1988). 
     Resources can act as both enabler and inhibitor.  The provision of too many or too few 
resources will inhibit radical innovation.  This perspective of “not too much” and “not too 
little” applies to several resources required for innovation (Hohria and Gulati, 1996).  
Gundling (2000) refers to this middle ground of resource provision as a “Goldilocks” 
principle.  In managing the people side of radical innovation, one of the leadership roles 
that facilitates innovation is that of a sponsor (Roberts, 1988; Dougherty and Heller, 1994; 
McDermott and O’Connor, 2002).  Management of a team tasked with developing radical 
innovation is participative (Wolff, 1988), proactive (, Melcher and Aupperle, 1989), and 
encourages risk taking, conflict and questioning.  These activities are perceived as 
unstructured and counter productive to management of routine business activities (Rice, 
O’Connor et al, 1998).  Loosening control is necessary for radical innovation (Ekvall, 
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1996; Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1996).  Kelly Johnson from the Lockheed Skunk Works 
suggested to Ben Rich that ‘Control is the name of the game and if a Skunk Works really 
operates right, control is exactly what they don’t get.’ (Rich and Janos, 1994:  288). 
 
Exploring the interrelationships between emerging themes and key constructs 
The themes and links between the themes were mapped using Decision Explorer.  The 
links are based on the literature discussed above.  The links are not intended to indicate 
precise causality.  The arrow shows the nature of the linkage.  Each arrow indicates that the 
theme at the tail has some influence on the theme at the head.  The links are based on 
connections suggested in the literature.  The nine themes are categorized as artefacts or 
values based on Schein’s model for this exercise.  The result is shown in Diagram 5. 
 
 
 
Diagram 5.  Map of links between the Themes based on Schein’s model 
 
This map indicates that Attitude to Risk is at the head with inputs from other themes.  
Company infrastructure is the tail with links into four themes.  The map shows each theme 
as an artefact (the visible manifestations of the culture) or as a value (that which people say 
is the reason for their behaviour or what they ideally would like those reasons to be).  A 
summary of the heads and tails derived from the key literature is shown in Table II. 
 
1 Team
infrastructure
2 Company
infrastructure
3 External
perspective
4 Clear objectives
5 Internal
confidence
6 Freedom / Latitude
7 Attitude to risk
8 Growth /
Development
9 External
confidence
Value Artefact
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Table II.  Links between the themes 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme Heads Key literature Tails Key literature 
Team 
constitution 
External perspective 
Internal confidence 
Freedom / Latitude 
Attitude to Risk 
Growth / Development 
(Reid and de Bretani, 2004) 
(Leifer et al, 2000) 
(Gryskiewicz, 1999) 
(Leifer et al, 2000) 
(Glynn, 1996) 
Company infrastructure (Humble and Jones, 1989) 
Company 
infrastructure 
Team constitution 
Clear objectives 
Freedom  / Latitude 
Attitude to Risk 
(Kanter, 1988) 
(Amabile, 1988b) 
(Harborne and Johne, 2003) 
(McDermott and Handfield Robert, 2000) 
  
External 
perspective 
Growth / Development (Terziovski, Sohal and Howell, 2002) Team constitution 
Internal confidence 
Growth / Development 
(Reid and de Bretani, 2004) 
(Glynn, 1996) 
(von Wartburg, Teichert et al, 2003) 
Clear 
objectives 
Freedom / Latitude (von Stamm, 2003) Company infrastructure (Simon, McKeough et al, 2003) 
Internal 
confidence 
External perspective 
Attitude to Risk 
Growth / Development 
(Syrett and Lammiman, 2002) 
(Syrett and Lammiman, 2002) 
(Sutton, 2001) 
Team constitution 
External confidence 
(Leifer et al, 2000) 
(Amabile, 1988b) 
Freedom / 
Latitude 
Team constitution 
Company infrastructure 
Clear objectives 
(Gryskiewicz, 1999) 
(Harborne and Johne, 2003) 
(Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby and Herron, 1996) 
Attitude to Risk (Amabile, 1988b; Ekvall, 1991) 
Attitude to 
risk 
  Team Constitution 
Company infrastructure 
Internal confidence 
Freedom / Latitude 
Growth / Development 
External confidence 
(Leifer, O'Connor et al, 2001) 
(Schmitt, 2003) 
(Claver, Llopis et al, 1998) 
(Amabile, 1988b; Ekvall, 1991) 
(Chatman and Cha, 2003; Frohman, 1998) 
(Kanter, 1988) 
Growth / 
Development 
External perspective 
Attitude to Risk 
External confidence 
(Roberts, 1988) 
(Chatman and Cha, 2003) 
(Sutton, 2001) 
Team constitution 
External perspective 
Internal confidence 
(Glynn, 1996) 
(Bessant, 2003) 
(Sutton, 2001) 
External 
confidence 
Growth / Development (Terziovski, Sohal et al, 2002) Internal confidence 
Attitude to Risk 
(Kanter, 1988) 
(Mascitelli, 2000) 
19 
Table III.  Archetypes of radical and incremental innovation 
ARCHETYPE  
Type  I Type  II 
 
Theme 
Incremental 
“Do better” 
Maintain 
Radical 
“Do different” 
Explore 
Freedom / 
Latitude 
Unnecessary, as systems and procedures can be used to control 
continuous improvement.  A process driven environment where 
incremental improvement is encouraged and rewarded. 
Necessary to allow the thinking to go beyond what currently exists.  
Exploration and discovery are part of the way things are done. 
Attitude to 
Risk 
Risk is minimized or avoided.  Following processes and procedures 
ensures that there is minimal exposure to uncertainty. 
Taking risks is encouraged.  Uncertainty is a part of the environment 
and discovery is accepted as being linked to taking risk. 
Growth / 
Development 
Unnecessary for the pursuit of incremental improvement activities.  
May hinder the procedures being followed . 
A desire to grow and develop the ability and knowledge of the group.  A 
hunger to know more and know why. 
External 
confidence 
Unnecessary for the pursuit of incremental improvement activities.  The 
incremental improvements are generated and controlled from within the 
group and are unaffected by external perception of the team. 
Having confidence and believing in the team supports the team’s ability 
to “do differently” in pursuit of radical solutions. 
Internal 
confidence 
Confidence is based in belief that following the system or working to a 
defined specification will lead to incremental improvements. 
Peer support and respect, whilst beneficial, is not essential.  Following 
the system is more important.  The team members are components of 
the system. 
Confidence among the team members that they can find a radical 
solution.  Working with and respecting the individual talents of each 
team member. 
Questioning, challenging but also supporting and nurturing the other 
team members. 
Team members are an autonomous unit that believes it can “do 
differently” to provide the radical solutions. 
External 
perspective 
Some relevance from the point of benchmarking, however this tends to 
provide a target for the team to match.  It reinforces the “do better” 
mentality of the team. 
Essential to provide alternative perspectives and awareness of new 
technologies.  These may not solve the problem but may trigger a “do 
different” solution that leads to radical innovation. 
Clear 
objectives 
Necessary for providing a target to work towards and guidelines to 
operate within. 
Too specific objectives may inhibit the discovery of alternatives.  
Objectives that are not specific and clearly defined will encourage 
questioning and permit knowledge advancement. 
Team 
Constitution 
Partly necessary for this group as individuals who can and are willing to 
follow the processes are required.  Experience of technology is only 
necessary for application of known tools and methods. 
Preferable if the team members are like-minded individuals who will 
work well together. 
The team must have a mix of creative individuals who have sufficient 
experience inside or outside the subject area such that they can apply 
lateral thinking to provide a radical solution.  The team should comprise 
different minded individuals who can work with some degree of 
uncertainty and conflict as part of the day-to-day activities. 
Company 
infrastructure 
Requires a management style that encourages conformance to rules and 
procedures.  Resources and time are necessary to complete the 
improvement tasks.  An environment that is supportive of a “do better” 
or “continuous improvement” approach is beneficial. 
Requires a management style that encourages risk taking.  Bureaucracy 
or autocracy are likely to inhibit this group.  Some restriction in 
resources is necessary for creativity – Goldilocks principle –not too 
little and not too much. 
Having a Champion to provide support at a high level is beneficial. 
20 
Archetypes of incremental and radical innovation culture 
Based on the themes derived from the research, the literature discussed above and the 
Greenwood and Hinings concept of archetypes, a model of Type I and Type II 
archetypes is proposed.  This describes an ideal position of the two organizational 
archetypes in the form of the nine emergent themes.  The model is shown in Table III. 
 
Discussion 
Comfort, caution, desire for safe solution and an aversion to doing differently appear in 
the analysis of the data.  The Cerulean Development team exhibit strong tendencies 
towards an incremental “do better” pattern of product development.  The attitude of the 
Development team has been described by the acting Technical Director as the opposite 
of a “can do” approach.  This may be a result of the risk-averse attitude within the 
team manifesting itself as justification for not taking action.  Radical innovation is 
rooted in risk and a firm that embraces radical innovation must also be prepared to 
embrace risk.  The Development team’s perspective that new product ideas should 
come from outside the team, in the view of the majority from the top management, 
indicates a perspective that encourages instruction following rather than taking a pro-
active approach. 
     The nine themes evolved during this stage of the project can be represented as 
either internal or external to the group and either visible (artefacts) or as perceived 
(values).  The group that falls into internal and perceived represent the domain of 
values within the group.  Although it could be suggested that some of the themes 
outside this area are not “organizational culture”, by adopting Schein’s model as a 
method of visualizing the culture of the group, it is argued that the other themes 
represent the visible manifestations of the group culture that relates to radical 
innovation.  The themes that have emerged from this stage of the research refer to the 
organizational culture that relates to radical innovation.  They do not and are not 
intended to represent a complete picture of the organizational culture of the group.  
The themes are also inter-linked.  The source of the links is the company 
infrastructure.  This is the environment in which the team operates and this theme acts 
to influence many of the other themes but is not influenced itself by any other theme.  
Attitude to Risk is at the head of several other themes.  This tends to indicate that the 
Development team’s perspective of taking risk is influenced by several other 
constructs, and as such is capable of being changed by addressing these other 
constructs.  The links to the themes in the internal and perceived (values) area of the 
model reflect the influence that the artefacts have on values and values have on 
artefacts, both acting upon each other to allow the organizational culture to develop 
(Hatch, 1993). 
     The themes do not exist as stand alone entities.  They co-exist as representations of 
the innovation enabling or inhibiting culture in the Cerulean Development team.  The 
data gathered relates to radical innovation, rather than innovation in general.  The 
results although applicable to the Cerulean team, do have some support in extant 
literature.  Therefore there may be some degree of generalizability outside the area 
being studied. 
     Using archetypes as a basis for representing the innovation supporting culture 
allows the development of two ideal positions.  Type I represents an incremental 
innovation supporting culture.  Type II represents an innovation culture that supports 
radical innovation.  The holistic approach that the use of archetypes facilitates allows 
the comparison and contrast of the two types.  There is some commonality, but there 
are also clear differences in the culture characteristics that operate to facilitate each 
type of innovation.  These are ideal types and it is unlikely that any organization would 
exhibit the characteristics of one type exclusively.  However the use of the ideal 
facilitates the “end point” towards which any change process or activities should be 
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directed in order to enable the desired characteristics for radical (or incremental) 
innovation.  Transition between archetypes is facilitated by using Schein’s model.  
Change can be distinguished between incremental change, frame breaking change and 
quantum change.  The dynamics of the process are different from incremental to large 
scale change, which involves movement from one archetype to another (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1993).  A series of interventions to facilitate change rather than a 
diffusion from one archetype to another is suggested as a method of moving towards a 
radical intervention culture.  If these interventions are perceived as actions taken at the 
artefact and value level in Schein’s model of culture, then transition between 
archetypes is possible by embedding new values and basic assumptions.  As the value 
leads to a behaviour and as that behaviour begins to solve the problem which prompted 
it, the value gradually is transformed into an underlying assumption about how things 
really are.  As the assumption is increasingly taken for granted, it drops out of 
awareness, thus creating a shift in the organizational culture.  This shift facilitates the 
transition towards Type II radical innovation culture.  The change necessary for the 
Cerulean Development team is to move the underlying beliefs and taken for granted 
assumptions about failure and risk taking to a position where these are believed to be 
opportunities for exploration and exploitation.  Further study on examples of 
successful and less successful radical innovations in mature small to medium sized 
firms would provide support for the innovation culture model suggested in the paper.  
Such studies would also indicate appropriate interventions to transition between Type I 
and Type II innovation cultures. 
 
Summary 
Learned behaviour in any organisational grouping or community is an outcome of the 
values, ideas, techniques, habits, routines which are passed on by one generation to 
another – in a sense “a social heritage”, which amounts to set of solutions to problems 
that others may have met and solved before.  This learned behaviour, or social 
inheritance, of any community is called “culture” (Bilton, Bonnett, Jones, Sheard, 
Stanworth, and Webster, 1987). 
     The nine themes represent aspects/attributes of Cerulean’s existing organisation 
culture that enable and inhibit the development (or institutionalization) of a radical 
innovation culture.  Using Greenwood and Hinings (1993) archetypes as a basis for 
representing the innovation supporting culture allows the development of two 
archetypes.  Type I represents an incremental innovation supporting culture.  Type II 
represents an innovation culture that supports radical innovation.  The holistic 
approach that the use of archetypes facilitates allows the comparison and contrast of 
the two types.  Whilst there is some commonality, there are also clear differences in 
the culture characteristics that operate to facilitate each type of innovation.  The 
archetypes are considered to be ideal types.  It is unlikely that any organization would 
exhibit the characteristics on one type exclusively.  However the use of the ideal 
facilitates the “end point” towards which any change process or activities should be 
directed in order to enable the desired characteristics for radical innovation.  The 
change necessary for Cerulean is for the Development team to change their underlying 
beliefs about risk taking to a position where risky decisions are believed to be 
opportunities for exploration and exploitation.  Schein’s model acts as a guide for 
managing and monitoring the transition between archetypes at various levels of 
analysis.  Any proposed interventions to change the innovation culture could be 
conceptualized as artefacts or values that lead to a change in the basic assumptions 
(Schein, 1992).  By changing the basic assumptions and values, behaviour changes can 
be embedded in the organization as “the way we do things around here”, thus leading 
to the desired radical innovation culture.  In this way a social heritage for “radicalness” 
could be created.
22 
References 
Abetti, P.A. (2003), ‘Over-Managing and Under-Managing Radical Technological Innovations:  
Lessons From USA, Japan and Europe’, in IEMC 03 Proceedings Managing Technologically Driven 
Organizations: "The Human Side of Innovation and Change" Albany, New York, IEEE, pp. 542-545. 
Acar, W., Melcher, A.J. and Aupperle, K.E. (1989), ‘The Implementation of Innovative Strategies’, 
International Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 631-651. 
Ahmed, P.K. (1998), ‘Culture and Climate for Innovation’, European Journal of Innovation 
Management, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 30-43. 
Ahuja, G. and Lampert, C.M. (2001), ‘Entrepreneurship in the Large Corporation:  a Longitudinal Study 
of How Established Firms Create Breakthrough Inventions’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, 
No. 6-7, June-July, pp. 521-543. 
Amabile, T., Conti, R., Coon, H., Lazenby, J. and Herron, M. (1996), ‘Assessing the Work Environment 
for Creativity’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 5, October, pp. 1154-1184. 
Amabile, T.M. (1988b), ‘A Model of Creativity and Innovation in Organizations’, in Straw, B.M. and 
Cummings, L.L.Research in Organizational Behavior: An Annual Series of Analytical Essays and 
Critical Reviews, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, pp. 123-167. 
Amabile, T.M. (1997), ‘Motivating Creativity in Organizations:  On Doing What You Love and Loving 
What You Do’, California Management Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, Fall, pp. 39-58. 
Andriopoulos, C. and Gotsi, M. (2002), ‘Lessons From a Creative Culture’, Design Management 
Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring, pp. 57-63. 
Bessant, J. (2003), High Involvement Innovation, John Wiley, Chichester. 
Bessant, J., Birkinshaw, J. and Delbridge, R. (2004a), ‘Theories of Creation’, People Management, Vol. 
10, No. 3, 12 February, pp. 28-31. 
Bhaskar, R. (1978), A Realist Theory of Science (Second edition), The Harvester Press, Sussex. 
Bilton, T., Bonnett, K., Jones, P., Sheard, K., Stanworth, M. and Webster, A. (1987), Introductory 
Sociology (Second edition), Macmillan Education, London. 
Bouwen, R. and Fry, R. (1991), ‘An Agenda for Managing Organizational Innovation and Development 
in the 1990s’, in Lambrecht, M. (Editor), Corporate Revival:  Managing into the Ninties, Catholic 
University Press, Leuven, Belgium, pp. 153-172. 
Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M. (1966), The Management of Innovation, Social Science Paperbacks, 
London. 
Chatman, J.A. and Cha, S.E. (2003), ‘Leading by Leveraging Culture’, California Management Review, 
Vol. 45, No. 4, Summer, pp. 2-0-34. 
Christensen, C.M. (1997), The Innovator’s Dilemma, Harvard Business School Press, USA. 
Christensen, C.M. and Overdorf, M. (2000), ‘Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change’, Harvard 
Business Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, March/April, pp. 66-76. 
Claver, E., Llopis, D.G. and Molina, H. (1998), ‘Organizational Culture for Innovation and New 
Technological Behavior’, Journal of High Technology Management Research, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring, pp. 
55-68. 
Coghlan, D. and Brannick, T. (2001), Doing Action Research in Your Own Organization, Sage, London. 
Cooper, R.G. and Kleinschmidt, E.J. (1990), New Products: The Key Factors in Success, American 
Marketing Association, USA. 
Coughlan, P. and Coghlan, D. (2002), ‘Action Research for Operations Management’, International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 220-240. 
Delbecq, A.L. and Mills, P.K. (1985), ‘Managerial Practices That Enhance Innovation’, Organizational 
Dynamics, Vol. 14, No. 1, Summer, pp. 24-34. 
Dewar, R.D. and Dutton, J.E. (1986), ‘The Adoption of Radical and Incremental Innovations:  An 
Empirical Analysis’, Management Science, Vol. 32, No. 11, November, pp. 1422-1433. 
Dougherty, D. and Heller, T. (1994), ‘The Illegitimacy of Successful Product Innovation in Established 
Firms’, Organization Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, May, pp. 200-218. 
DTI (2003), DTI Economics Paper No 7:  Competing in the Global Economy- The Innovation 
Challenge,  UK Department of Trade and Industry, London,  
Eden, C. (1988), ‘Cognitive Mapping’, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 36, No. 1, July, 
pp. 1-13. 
Ekvall, G. (1991), ‘The Organizational Culture of Idea-Management: a Creative Climate for the 
Management of Ideas’, in Henry, J. and Walker, D. (Editors), Managing Innovation, Sage, London, pp. 
23 
73-79. 
Ekvall, G. (1996), ‘Organizational Climate for Creativity and Innovation’, European Journal of Work 
and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 105-123. 
Ettlie, J.E., Bridges, W.P. and O'Keefe, R.D. (1984), ‘Organization Strategy and Structural Differences 
for Radical Versus Incremental Innovation’, Management Science, Vol. 30, No. 6, June, pp. 682-695. 
Farson, R. and Keyes, R. ( 2002), ‘The Failure-Tolerant Leader’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 80, 
No. 8, August, pp. 64-71. 
Frohman, A.L. (1998), ‘Building a Culture for Innovation’, Research Technology Management, Vol. 41, 
No. 2, March/April, pp. 9-12. 
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967), The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Aldine Publishing, 
Hawthorne, NY. 
Glynn, M.A. (1996), ‘Innovative Genius:  A Framework for Relating Individual and Organizational 
Intelligences to Innovation’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, October, pp. 1081-1111. 
Greenwood, R. and Hinings, C.R. (1993), ‘Understanding Strategic Change: The Contribution of 
Archetypes’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5, October, pp. 1052-1081. 
Gresov, C. (1984), ‘Designing Organizations to Innovate and Implement: Using Two Dilemmas to 
Create a Solution’, Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter, pp. 63-67. 
Gryskiewicz, S.S. (1999), Positive Turbulence, Jossey Bass, San Francisco. 
Gudmundson, D., Tower, C.B. and Harman, E.A.  (2003), ‘Innovation in Small Businesses:  Culture and 
Ownership Structure Do Matter’, Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, Vol. 8, No. 1, April, pp. 
1-17. 
Gundling, E. (2000), The 3M Way to Innovation, Kodansha International, Tokyo. 
Harborne, P. and Johne, A. (2003), ‘Creating a Project Climate for Successful Product Innovation’, 
European Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 118-132. 
Hargadon, A. and Sutton, R.I. (2000), ‘Building an Innovation Factory’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 
78, No. 3, May/June, pp. 157-166. 
Hatch, M.J. (1993), ‘The Dynamics of Organizational Culture’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 
18, No. 4, pp. 657-693. 
Hauser, M. (1998), ‘Organizational Culture and Innovativeness of Firms - an Integrative View ’, 
International Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 16, No. 1/2/3, pp. 239-253. 
Heilmeir, G.H. (2000), ‘Enabling Innovation the "No Excuses" Way’, Research Technology 
Management, Vol. 43, No. 3, May / June, pp. 26. 
Heine, C. (2001), ‘Is Your Company Innovative?’, Machine Design, Vol. 73, No. 14, 26  July, pp. 84-
88. 
Hill, C.W.L. and Rothaermel, F.T. (2003), ‘The Performance of Incumbent Firms in the Face of Radical 
Technological Innovation’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, April, pp. 257-274. 
Hohria, N. and Gulati, R. (1996), ‘Is Slack Good or Bad for Innovation?’, Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 39, No. 5, October, pp. 1245-1264. 
Huizenga, E. (2000), Innovation Management  How Front Runners Stay Ahead, Universitaire pers 
Maastricht, Maastricht. 
Humble, J. and Jones, G. ( 1989), ‘Creating a Climate for Innovation’, Long Range Planning, Vol. 22, 
No. 4, August, pp. 46-51. 
Jenkins, M. (2002), ‘Cognitive Mapping’, in Partington, D. (Editor), Essential Skills for Management 
Research, Sage, London, pp. 181-198. 
Kanter, R.M. (1988), ‘When a Thousand Flowers Bloom:  Structural, Collective, and Social Conditions 
for Innovation in Organization’, in Straw, B.M. and Cummings, L.L. (Editors), Research in 
Organizational Behavior: An Annual Series of Analytical Essays and Critical Reviews, JAI Press, 
Greenwich, CT, pp. 169-211. 
Kaplan, N. (1960), ‘Some Organizational Factors Affecting Creativity’, IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, March, pp. 24-30. 
Langfield-Smith, K. (1992), ‘Exploing the Need for a Shared Cognitive Map’, Journal of Management 
Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, May, pp. 349-368. 
Lee, M. and Na, D. (1994), ‘Determinants of Technical Success in Product Development When 
Innovative Radicalness Is Considered’, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
January, pp. 62-68. 
Leifer, R., McDermott, C.M., O’Connor, G.C., Peters, L.S., Rice, M.P. and Veyzer, R.W. (2000), 
24 
Radical Innovation  How Mature Companies Can Outsmart Upstarts, Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, Massachusetts. 
Leifer, R., O'Connor, G.C. and Rice, M. (2001), ‘Implementing Radical Innovation in Mature Firms: 
The Role of Hubs’, Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 15, No. 3, August, pp. 102-113. 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992 ), ‘Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities: a Paradox in Managing New 
Product Development’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, No. 8, Summer, pp. 111-125. 
Marquis, D.G. (1988), ‘The Anatomy of Successful Innovation’, in Tushman, M.L. and Moore, W.L. 
(Editors), Readings in the Management of Innovation, Ballinger Publishing, USA, pp. 79-87. 
Martins, E.C. and Terblanche, F. (2003), ‘Building Organisational Culture That Stimulates Creativity 
and Innovation’,  European Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 64-74. 
Mascitelli, R. (2000), ‘From Experience:  Harnessing Tacit Knowledge to Achieve Breakthough 
Innovation’, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 17, No. 3, May, pp. 179-193. 
McDermott, C. and Handfield, R. (1996), ‘Does the Parallel Approach Make Sense in the Development 
of Discontinuous Innovations?’, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Engineering and 
Technology Management IEEE, pp. 370-374. 
McDermott, C. and Handfield Robert (2000), ‘Concurrent Development and Strategic Outsourcing: Do 
the Rules Change in Breakthrough Innovation?’, Journal of High Technology Management Research, 
Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring, pp. 35-57. 
McDermott, C.M. (1999), ‘Managing Radical Product Development in Large Manufacturing Firms: a 
Longitudinal Study’, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 17, No. 6, November, pp. 631-644. 
McDermott, C.M. and O’Connor, G.C. (2002), ‘Managing Radical Innovation: an Overview of 
Emergent Strategy Issues’, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 19, No. 6, November, pp. 
424-438. 
McFadzean, E. (2000), ‘Techniques to Enhance Creative Thinking’, Team Performance Management:  
An International Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3/4, pp. 62-72. 
Nemeth, C.J. (1997), ‘Managing Innovation:  When Less Is More’, California Management Review, 
Vol. 40, No. 1, Fall, pp. 59-74. 
Nijhof, A., Krabbendam, K. and Looise, J.C. (2002), ‘Innovation Through Exemptions: Building Upon 
the Existing Creativity of Employees’, Technovation, Vol. 22, No. 11, November, pp. 675-683. 
O'Connor, G.C. and McDermott, C.M. (2004), ‘The Human Side of Radical Innovation’, Journal of 
Engineering and Technology Management, Vol. 2, No. 1-2, March-June, pp. 11-30. 
O'Connor, G.C. and Rice, M.P. (2001), ‘Opportunity Recognition and Breakthrough Innovation in Large 
Established Firms’, California Management Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, Winter, pp. 95-116. 
O'Connor, G.C. and Veryzer, R.W. (2001), ‘The Nature of Market Visioning for Technology-Based 
Radical Innovation’, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 18, No. 4, July, pp. 231-246. 
Partington, D. (2002), ‘Grounded Theory’, in Partington, D. (Editor), Essential Skills for Management 
Research, Sage, London, pp. 136-157. 
Prather, C.W. (2000), ‘Keeping Innovation Alive After the Consultants Leave’, Research Technology 
Management, Vol. 43, No. 5, September, pp. 17-22. 
Reason, P. and Bradbury, H. (Editors) (2001), Handbook of Action Research  Participative Inquiry and 
Practice, Sage, London. 
Reid, S.E. and de Bretani, U. (2004), ‘The Fuzzy Front End of New Product Development for 
Discontinuous Innovations: A Theoretical Model’, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 21, 
No. 3, May, pp. 170-184. 
Rice, M.P., O’Connor, G.C., Peters, L.S. and Morone, J.G. (1998), ‘Managing Discontinuous 
Innovation’, Research Technology Management, Vol. 41, No. 3, May/June, pp. 52-58. 
Rich, B.R. and Janos, L. (1994), Skunk Works, Little, Brown and Company, Boston. 
Rickards, T. (1985), Stimulating Innovation, Frances Pinter, London. 
Roberts, E.B. (1988), ‘Managing Invention and Innovation’, Research Technology Management, Vol. 
31, No. 1, January/February, pp. 11-27. 
Rothwell, R. (1992), ‘Successful Industrial Innovation: Critical Factors for the 1990s’, R&D 
Management, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 221-239 . 
Rothwell, R. and Dodgson, M. (1991), ‘External Linkages and Innovation in Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises’, R&D Management, Vol. 21, No. 2, April, pp. 125-137. 
Sackmann, S.A. (1991), ‘Uncovering Culture in Organizations’, Journal of Applied Behavioural 
Science, Vol. 27, No. 3, September, pp. 295-317. 
25 
Schein, E.H. (1984), ‘Coming to a New Awareness of Organizational Culture’, Sloan Management 
Review, Vol. 25, Winter, pp. 3-16. 
Schein, E.H. (1991), ‘What Is Culture?’, in Frost, P.J., Moore, L.F., Louis, M.R., Lundberg, C.C. and 
Martin, J. (Editors), Reframing Organizational Culture, Sage , Newbury Park, California, pp. 243-253. 
Schein, E.H. (1992), Organizational Culture and Leadership (Second edition), Jossey-Bass , San 
Francisco. 
Schmitt, R.W. (2003), ‘Leadership in Technological Innovation (and Elsewhere)’, Research Technology 
Management, Vol. 43, No. 3, May, pp. 30-31. 
Schroeder, R.G., Scudder, G.D. and Elm, D.R.  (1989), ‘Innovation in Manufacturing’, Journal of 
Operations Management, Vol. 8 , No. 1, January, pp. 1-15. 
Simon, E.S., McKeough, D.T., Ayers, A.D., Rinehart, E. and Alexia, B. (2003), ‘How Do You Best 
Organize for Radical Innovation’, Research Technology Management, Vol. 46, No. 5, September / 
October, pp. 17-20. 
Sternberg, R.J., O'Hara, L.A. and Lubart, T.I. (1997), ‘Creativity As Investment’, California 
Management Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, Fall, pp. 8-21. 
Sutton, R.I. (2001), ‘The Weird Rules of Creativity’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 79, No. 8, 
September, pp. 94-103. 
Sutton, R.I. and Kelley, T.A. (1997), ‘Creativity Doesn't Require Isolation’, California Management 
Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, Fall, pp. 75-91. 
Swan, J. (1997), ‘Using Cognitive Mapping in Management Research: Decisions About Technical 
Innovation’, British Journal of Management, Vol. 8, No. 2, June, pp. 183-198. 
Syrett, M. and Lammiman, J. (Editor) (2002), Successful Innovation  How to Encourage and Shape 
Profitable Ideas, The Economist in association with Profile Books, London. 
Terziovski, M., Sohal, A. and Howell, A. (2002), ‘Best Practice in Product Innovation at Varian 
Australia’, Technovation, Vol. 22, No. 9, September, pp. 561-569. 
Tidd, J., Bessant, J. and Pavitt, K. (2001), Managing Innovation  Integrating Technological Market and 
Organizational Change (Second edition), Wiley, Chichester. 
Tushman, M.L. and Anderson, P. (1986), ‘Technological Discontinuities and Organizational 
Environments’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, September, pp. 439-465. 
Tushman, M.L. and O'Reilly III, C.A. (1999), ‘Building Ambidextrous Organizations’, Health Forum 
Journal, Vol. 42, March/April, pp. 20-23 and 64. 
Tushman, M.L. and O’Reilly III, C.A. (1996), ‘Ambidextrous Organizations: Managing Evolutionary 
and Revolutionary Change’, California Management Review, Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer, pp. 8-30. 
Utterback, J.M. (1994), Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 
MA. 
Veryzer, R.W. (1998), ‘Discontinuous Innovation and the New Product Development Process’, Journal 
of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 15, No. 4, July, pp. 304-321. 
von Stamm, B. (2003),  Managing Innovation, Design and Creativity, John Wiley, Chichester. 
von Wartburg, I., Teichert, T. and Rost, K. (2003), ‘Visioning for Innovation- How Firms Inject 
Knowledge About the Future into Innovation Activities’, in IEMC 03 Proceedings Managing 
Technologically Driven Organizations: "The Human Side of Innovation and Change" Albany, New 
York, IEEE, pp. 301-305. 
Wolff, M.F. (1988), ‘Fostering Breakthrough Innovations’, Research Technology Management, Vol. 31, 
No. 6, Nov/Dec, pp. 8-9. 
Wolpert, J.D. (2002), ‘Breaking Out of the Innovation Box’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 80, No. 8, 
August, pp. 77-83. 
Yin, R.K. (2003), Case Study Research  Design and Methods (Third edition), Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
California. 
